Anna Lee Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Ralph Pahnke : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Anna Lee Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
Ralph Pahnke : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph J. Palmer; Reid E. Lewis; Moyle and Draper; Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees.
James E. Morton; Ronald C. Wolthuis; Thompson, Hatch, Morton and Skeen; Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Anderson v. Reynolds, No. 910476.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3704
V» -T> _ /• > _^> V» < ^ 9
^0Po 8 , 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ANNA LEE ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff - Appellant, 
VS. 
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., a 
Foreign Corporation, RALPH 
PAHNKE and JOHN DOES 1 through 
25, 
Defendants - Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Supreme Court No. 910476 
Priority 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Joseph J. Palmer #2505 
Reid E. Lewis #1951 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
600 Deseret Plaza 
15 E. 100 S. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-0250 
Attorneys for Defendants -
Appellees 
James E. Morton, #A3739 
Ronald C. Wolthuis, #4699 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
1245 Brickyard Rd., #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 484-3000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff -
Appellant 
H V fassse % -saw 1-tsr t7 
J»\ ': 7 199?. 
CLEHK SUPREME COUP-
UTAH 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ANNA LEE ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff - Appellant, 
vs. 
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., a 
Foreign Corporation, RALPH 
PAHNKE and JOHN DOES 1 through 
25, 
Defendants - Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Supreme Court No. 910476 
Priority 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Joseph J. Palmer #2505 
Reid E. Lewis #1951 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
600 Deseret Plaza 
15 E. 100 S. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-0250 
Attorneys for Defendants -
Appellees 
James E. Morton, #A3739 
Ronald C. Wolthuis, #4699 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
1245 Brickyard Rd., #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 484-3000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff -
Appellant 
I. 
PARTIES IN THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
First Complaint: 
Anna Lee Anderson, Plaintiff. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Defendant. 
Ralph Pahnke, Defendant. 
Amended Complaint: 
David M. Dudley, Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust, 
Plaintiff. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Defendant. 
Ralph Pahnke, Defendant. 
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III. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
This is an appeal of an Order of the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, dated September 16, 1991 
granting defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. This appeal also 
challenges the subsequent Order of the same court dated September 
27, 1991 dismissing this case. The Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-
2-2(3)(j) (1953) as amended. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether a beneficiary to a trust may be a proper party 
to bring a suit for violation of the trust agreement against 
third parties. The allegations in plaintiff's Complaint must be 
taken as true. The trial court's ruling should be affirmed only 
if it is clear that plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any 
state of facts which could be proved in support of her claim. 
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1990). 
2. Whether the trustee of a trust is an indispensible party 
to an action for violation of the trust agreement against third 
parties. The allegations in plaintiff's Complaint must be taken 
as true. The trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it 
is clear that plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any state 
of facts which could be proved in support of her claim. Colman 
v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1990). 
3. Whether plaintiff's claims against third parties were 
barred by the statute of limitations when plaintiff did not learn 
of her cause of action until December, 1990. The allegations in 
plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be taken as true. Plaintiff 
submitted affidavits in opposition to defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss. The affidavits were not excluded by the court, thus 
converting the motion to one treated as a summary judgment motion 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Court must view the facts on the second motion to dismiss in the 
8 
light most favorable to the losing party, the plaintiff. Themy 
v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979). 
The Court should review the trial courts view of the law for 
correctness. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 




The determinative rules in this case are as follows: 
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction 
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
ciency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permit-
ted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further plead-
ing after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim 
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for 
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure 
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
Rule 19(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter 
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, mul-
tiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If 
he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he 
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, 
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue 
and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be 
dismissed from the action. 
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Rule 56(b) & (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
1 1 
VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This action was filed in the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah by Anna Lee Anderson as plaintiff 
on the 6th day of December, 1990. Plaintiff sought damages 
against defendants for breach of contract, tortious interference 
with contract, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. (Rec. 1 
- 12) . 
2. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss plaintifffs 
Complaint on the 15th day of April, 1991 pursuant to Rules 
12(b)(6)-(7) and 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rec. 
40) . 
3. Judge J. Dennis Frederick granted defendants1 Motion to 
Dismiss without oral argument on the 16th day of July, 1991. 
(Rec. 91). 
4. Prior to the execution and entry of the Order granting 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff filed an Amended 
Complaint naming David M. Dudley, Trustee of the Norman Anderson 
Trust as plaintiff with the same causes of action alleged against 
defendants. (Rec. 92 -104). 
5. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint on the 7 th day of August, 1991 pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rec. 139). 
6. After hearing on September 16, 1991, Judge J. Dennis 
Frederick granted defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Rec. 213). 
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VII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about November 20, 1978, Norman Anderson executed 
a Trust Agreement which created the Norman Anderson Trust. (Rec. 
2, para. 5). 
2. On or about November 28, 1978, Plaintiff Anna Lee 
Anderson executed a Trust Agreement which created the Anna Lee 
Anderson Trust. (Rec. 2, para. 6). 
3. In addition, during the approximate same period of time, 
both Norman Anderson and Anna Lee Anderson executed their 
respective Last Wills and Testaments. (Rec. 3, para. 7). 
4. Shortly after the execution by Norman Anderson of the 
Trust Agreement establishing the Norman Anderson Trust, Norman 
Anderson transferred certain property into said Trust. Included 
in such transfer were 20,500 shares of the common stock of Levi 
Strauss & Co. (Rec. 3, para. 8). 
5. James N. Anderson, Norman Anderson and Anna Lee 
Anderson's son, was designated by the Norman Anderson Trust 
Agreement as the Trustee for such Trust. (Rec. 3, para. 9; Rec. 
146, para. 2; Rec. 152, para. 4). 
6. That Anna Lee Anderson is the sole Beneficiary of the 
Norman Anderson Trust (Rec. 147, para. 2). 
7. On or about November 20, 1978, Norman Anderson 
established an account with Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
at its Salt Lake City office. (Rec. 3, para. 10). 
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8. Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. was furnished a 
copy of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement at the time such 
Trust Account was opened with Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc. (Rec. 3, para. 11; Rec. 147, para. 4). 
9. Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. forwarded a copy of 
the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement to its trust department 
located at the regional office of Dean Witter Reynolds in San 
Francisco, California. (Rec. 3, para. 12). 
10. The Dean Witter Reynolds trust department in San 
Francisco, California reviewed said Trust Agreement and set 
directives to the Salt Lake City office of Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc. with respect to the handling by Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
of the Norman Anderson Trust. (Rec. 3-4, para. 13). 
11. The Norman Anderson Trust Agreement, provides for the 
creation upon the death of Norman Anderson of two trusts, namely, 
a "Marital Trust" and a "Family Trust". (Rec. 4, para. 14). 
12. The provisions of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement 
direct the Trustee, and third parties dealing with the Trustee, 
with respect to the maintenance, administration, management and 
distribution of assets held in said Trust. (Rec. 4, para. 15). 
13. The Marital Trust requires the Trustee to distribute 
income from the Marital Trust to Anna Lee Anderson on at least a 
quarterly basis. (Rec. 4, para. 16). 
14. In addition, the Marital Trust allows the Trustee to 
make distributions of principal to Anna Lee Anderson for her 
14 
care, comfort, support and maintenance including the purchase of 
residences. (Rec. 4, para. 17). 
15. The Marital Trust also provides that the Trustee may 
make distributions of principal to any person designated in 
writing by Anna Lee Anderson. (Rec. 4, para. 18). 
16. The Family Trust allows the Trustee to make 
distributions of principal to Anna Lee Anderson, provided income 
from all other sources (including the Marital Trust) are 
insufficient for her care, comfort, support and maintenance. 
(Rec. 5, para. 19). 
17. The Family Trust provides for the distribution of the 
balance of the Family Trust assets after Anna Lee Anderson's 
death. (Rec. 5, para. 20). 
18. On or about May 8, 1990, Defendant Ralph Pahnke 
prepared a letter on the letterhead of Defendant Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. which provided for the distribution of 41,000 
shares of the common stock of Levi Strauss & Co. as follows: 
a. 24,118 shares were distributed to the personal 
securities account at Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. of James N. 
Anderson; 
b. 16,882 shares were distributed to the Anna Lee Anderson 
Trust Account at Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (Rec. 5, para. 21; 
Rec. 147, para. 5). 
19. The value of the Levi Strauss & Co. stock distributed 
to James N. Anderson amount to $871,238.63. (Rec. 5, para. 22). 
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20. The value of the Levi Strauss & Co. stock distributed 
to the Anna Lee Anderson Trust amounted to $609,845.36. (Rec. 5, 
para. 23). 
21. Neither of the distributions were in accordance with 
the provisions, terms and conditions of the Norman Anderson Trust 
Agreement which was in the possession of Defendant Pahnke and 
Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (Rec. 5, para. 24; Rec. 153, 
para. 9). 
22. Subsequent to such distributions, Defendant Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. continued to manage the Anna Lee Anderson Trust 
Account. During the terms of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s 
management of such Trust Account, the Trust Account became 
valueless. (Rec. 5, para. 25). 
23. The distributions induced by and affected by Defendant 
Pahnke and Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds were unlawful, and in 
direct contravention of the provisions of the Norman Anderson 
Trust Agreement. (Rec. 5, para. 25; Rec. 153, para. 9). 
24. James N. Anderson, as Trustee of the Norman Anderson 
Trust, never questioned the propriety of the transfers from the 
Norman Anderson Trust due to his reliance upon Defendant Pahnke 
and Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds and consequently never 
disclosed to the beneficiary, Anna Lee Anderson, the transfer of 
those assets until December, 1990. (Rec. 147-48, para. 6). 
25. The sole beneficiary of the Norman Anderson Trust, Anna 
Lee Anderson, never examined a copy of the Norman Anderson Trust 
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until December, 1990. (Rec. 152, para. 5). 
26. In preparation for an arbitration hearing with respect 
to the Anna Lee Anderson Trust in December, 1990, the beneficiary 
of the Norman Anderson Trust, Anna Lee Anderson, discovered that 
the assets which were supposed to be deposited in the Norman 
Anderson Trust had been transferred in direct contravention of 
the terms of said trust to the Anna Lee Anderson Trust and the 
personal account of James N. Anderson. (Rec. 153, para. 9; Rec. 
155, para. 15). 
27. Upon discovering that the transfer of assets out of the 
Norman Anderson Trust was inappropriate, attorneys for the Anna 
Lee Anderson Trust attempted to have the issue of the 
inappropriate transfer of assets from the Norman Anderson Trust 
determined at the pending arbitration hearing, but was advised by 
the arbitrators to dispose of those issues in a separate 
proceeding. (Rec. 153-54, para. 11). 
28. Upon discovering in December, 1990 the wrongful 
transfer of assets from the Norman Anderson Trust, Anna Lee 
Anderson caused the original Complaint to be filed in Third 
District Court in December, 1990. (Rec. 154, para. 12). 
29. Subsequent to the conclusion of the arbitration 
proceeding dealing with the Anna Lee Anderson Trust, Anna Lee 
Anderson requested the resignation of James N. Anderson as 
Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust and designated David M. 
Dudley as Successor Trustee. (Rec. 154, para. 13). 
30. Had Anna Lee Anderson been aware of any time prior to 
17 
December, 1990 of the wrongful transfer of assets from the Norman 
Anderson Trust, she would have asserted her rights thereunder 
immediately. (Rec. 154, para. 14). 
18 
VIII. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In this case, the original plaintiff, Anna Lee Anderson is 
the beneficiary of the Norman Anderson Trust. Her son, James 
Anderson was the trustee of the trust. In direct violation of 
the terms of the trust, James Anderson transferred the bulk of 
the trust assets (stocks) to his own personal account which was 
managed by Defendants Ralph Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds. 
Pahnke was the account executive for not only James Anderson's 
personal account, but also for the trust's account. Both Pahnke 
and Dean Witter had been provided copies of the Norman Anderson 
Trust and were familiar with the limitations and conditions 
therein. In spite of their knowledge of the impropriety of the 
transfer of stock from the Norman Anderson Trust account into 
James Anderson's personal account, Pahnke and Dean Witter 
authorized the transfer and participated in the same receiving 
commissions therefrom. 
Anna Lee Anderson was unaware of this transfer and that it 
was in violation of the Norman Anderson Trust. Immediately upon 
learning of the violation, Anna Lee Anderson filed this action 
against defendants in December, 1990. Anna Lee Anderson was the 
proper party plaintiff because the trustee, her son, had 
neglected to bring such an action. It is clear that a 
beneficiary may bring an action against a third party who 
participates in a breach of trust by the trustee. 
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It is also clear that James Anderson is not an indispensible 
party in this case. As stated above, a beneficiary can bring 
such an action against third parties when the trustee fails to do 
so. Furthermore, defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter have assumed 
the roles of defacto trustees for their participation in the 
breach of trust. Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter are certainly 
free to bring in James Anderson as a third party defendant should 
they deem his presence in the suit necessary. 
After plaintiff's original Complaint was dismissed by the 
district court, but prior to execution and entry of the Order, 
plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint naming David M. Dudley, 
substituted trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust, as plaintiff. 
Defendants then moved to dismiss claiming that plaintiff's claims 
were barred by the statute of limitations. It is clear, however, 
that a third party participant in a breach of trust by a trustee 
cannot assert the statute of limitations as a defense. 
Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter were knowing participants in 
the breach of trust by James Anderson. They cannot now, as joint 
tortfeasors, benefit from the passage of time since the transfer. 
Plaintiff acted immediately as soon as she discovered that the 
transfer of stocks by James Anderson was in violation of the 
Norman Anderson Trust. Consequently, the district court erred in 




I. The Beneficiary Is A Proper Party To Bring Suit For 
A Violation Of The Trust Agreement 
It is a generally accepted principle that beneficiaries of a 
trust cannot maintain an action against third parties who have 
acted adversely to the trust. Rather, it is well settled that 
ordinarily such actions must be maintained by the trustee. The 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §281 (1976) provides: 
(1) Where the trustee could maintain an action at 
law or suit in equity or other proceeding against a 
third person if the trustee held the property free 
of trust, the beneficiary cannot maintain an action 
at law against the third person, except as stated 
in Subsection (2). 
Similarly, §282 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, (1976) 
provides: 
(1) Where the trustee could maintain an action at 
law or suit in equity or other proceeding against a 
third person if the trustee held the property free 
of trust, the beneficiary cannot maintain a suit in 
equity against the third person, except as stated 
in Subsections (2) and (3). 
(2) If the trustee improperly refuses or neglects 
to bring an action against the third person, the 
beneficiary can maintain a suit in equity against 
the trustee and the third person. 
(3) If the trustee cannot be subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the court or if there is no 
trustee, the beneficiary can maintain a suit in 
equity against the third person, if such suit is 
necessary to protect the interest of the 
beneficiary. 
The theory requiring such actions to be maintained by the trustee 
is based upon the presumption that the wrong is actually against 
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the trustee who is responsible for managing the trust estate. 
Any wrongful interference with these interests of 
the normal trustee is therefore a wrong to the 
trustee and gives him a cause of action for redress 
or to prevent a continuance of the improper 
conduct. Although the beneficiary is adversely 
affected by such acts of a third person, no cause 
of action inures to him on that account. The right 
to sue in the ordinary case vests in the trustee as 
a representative. 
G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts And Trustees, §869 at 87 (Rev. 2nd 
Ed. 1982). The cases supporting this position are numerous. 
Utah has codified the general rule allowing trustees to 
maintain actions on behalf of the trust estate. "(3) A trustee 
has the power . . . to: (z) prosecute or defend actions, claims, 
or proceedings for the protection of trust assets and of the 
trustee in the performance of his duties; . . . " Utah Code Ann. 
§75-7-402(3)(z) (1953) as amended. It is important to note that 
this statute merely allows the trustee to maintain certain 
actions; it does not preclude the beneficiary from maintaining an 
action on behalf of himself or the trust. 
As with most general principles of law, the foregoing 
limitation on the rights of beneficiaries to maintain actions 
against third parties is subject to some exceptions. Such an 
exception exists in the present case. 
The situation is different where the trustee in 
breach of trust transfers property to a third 
person. In this situation the third person is not 
acting adversely to the trustee, and would have 
done no wrong and incurred no liability if the 
trustee had held the property free of trust. The 
wrong that he commits is a wrong to the 
beneficiaries in taking or retaining the property 
after he has notice of the breach of trust, and he 
thereby incurs a liability to them unless, indeed, 
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he is a bona fide purchaser. In this situation, 
therefore, the beneficiaries can maintain a suit in 
equity against the transferee, if he took with 
notice of the breach of trust or paid no value. 
IV A. Scott, The Law of Trusts, §294.1 at 99 (4th Ed. 1989). 
Indeed, the vast majority of jurisdictions recognize a right of 
the beneficiary to initiate and prosecute actions for breach of a 
trust agreement. See, Chicago City Bank & Trust Company v. 
Lesman, 542 N.E.2d 824 (111. 1989) (Remainder beneficiaries to a 
trust are "interested parties" who have an interest in 
maintaining the assets of the trust estate, and, as such, may 
institute actions for mismanagement of the trust); Fortune v. 
First Union National Bank, 371 S.E.2d 483 (N.C. 1988) (Trust 
beneficiary may maintain action in his individual capacity for 
damages due to mismanagement of trust) ; Edcreworth v. First 
National Bank of Chicago, 677 F.Supp. 982 (S.D.Ind. 1988) (To 
extent that income beneficiary's claims against officers and 
directors of corporation whose stock was held by trust were 
premised on their knowing participation in alleged breach of 
fiduciary duty by co-trustees, beneficiary had standing to assert 
claims); Hoyle v. Dickinson, 746 P.2d 18 (Ariz. 1987) (trust 
Beneficiary may bring action for damages against trustee or third 
party for breach of trust agreement); Alioto v. United States, 
593 F.Supp. 1402 (N.D.Cal. 1984) (Beneficiary is allowed to bring 
action against trustee and constructive trustee, either 
separately or jointly as co-defendants, and there is no 
requirement that beneficiary's action against constructive 
trustee be premised on beneficiary's inability to recover from 
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trustee); Reynolds v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N.A., 471 
S.2d 1238 (Ala. 1982) (Beneficiaries have standing to invoke 
equity jurisdiction to hear action challenging trustee's prudence 
in investing common trust funds, even though trustee itself held 
legal title to assets in the funds); Velez v. Feinstein, 451 
N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. 1982) (Beneficiary may bring action on behalf 
of trust due to futility in making demand upon trustee because of 
conflict of interest). 
The case law in Utah addressing the rights of a beneficiary 
to a trust in pursuing an action against third parties is es-
pecially sparse. The only Utah case with remotely similar facts 
as the present case is Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemm, 76 Utah 
372, 290 P. 161 (1930). In Salina Canyon, the plaintiff had 
brought an action to quiet title to certain property located in 
Morgan County. The acquisition of the property had been arranged 
by one Lehman who had been acting on behalf of a mining develop-
ment company. Lehman subsequently organized the plaintiff, 
Salina Canyon Coal Co. The mining development company intervened 
in the quiet title action claiming interest in the subject 
property as the beneficiary of a trust for which Lehman was the 
trustee. Relying upon §6495, Comp. Laws Utah, 1917, the Court 
found that the mining development company, as beneficiary to the 
trust, was the real party in interest and had a right to sue. 
290 P. at 167. Comp. Laws Utah, 1917, §6495 defined real parties 
in interest and appears to be the predecessor of what is now Rule 
17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Salina Canvon Court 
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went on to say that M[a]ll courts hold a beneficiary under a 
trust may sue to protect his rights, especially in a case where 
his interests are hostile to those of the trustee*" Id, 
The facts of the instant case are similar to those in Ezell 
v, Fletcher, 650 S.W.2d 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). In Ezell, the 
plaintiffs were beneficiaries of a trust with owned certain 
stocks and bonds. The trustee, in violation of the trust 
agreement, pledged the stocks and bonds as security for an 
obligation of a corporation in favor of defendant Fletcher. The 
trustee of the trust was joined by the defendants as a third 
party defendant. In their complaint, the plaintiffs sought the 
return of the stocks and bonds from defendants. 650 S.W.2d at 
34. The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial Court's 
judgment granting the plaintiffs the relief sought in their 
complaint finding that the defendants knowingly participated in 
the breach of trust and the defendants were therefore liable. 
Id. at 36-37. 
It is also well established that third parties who par-
ticipate in a breach of trust are liable to the beneficiary even 
though such third parties may not have been transferees of trust 
assets. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §326 provides that 
"[a] third person who, although not a transferee of trust 
property, has notice that the trustee is committing a breach of 
trust and participates therein is liable to the beneficiary for 
any loss caused by the breach of trust." The comments to §326 
address the very circumstance present in the present case. 
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"Thus, if the trustee directs an agent to sell trust property, 
which the agent knows the trustee is not authorized to sell, and 
he does sell it, he is liable for participation in the breach of 
trust." Id., comment a. at 124. The liability of a stockbroker 
who participates in such a breach of trust is equally clear. 
If the broker has notice that the trustee is 
committing a breach of trust in making the pur-
chases or sales, he is liable for participation in 
the breach of trust. The broker is liable where he 
has actual knowledge or where the circumstances 
show that the trustee is committing a breach of 
trust in making the purchase or sale through the 
agency of the broker. 
IV A. Scott, The Law of Trusts, §326.2 at 296 (4th Ed. 1989). 
See, also, Titcomb v. Billings, Olcott & Co., 104 F.Supp. 168 
(S.D. N.Y. 1952); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & SMith Inc. v. 
Bocock, 247 F.Supp. 373 (S.D. Tex. 1965). 
In the present case, there is no question that James 
Anderson, as trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust breached the 
terms of the trust transferring the trust assets to his own 
account. There is also no question that Defendants Ralph Pahnke 
and Dean Witter Reynolds were aware of the specific terms of the 
Norman Anderson Trust, and thus, were aware that James Anderson's 
transfer of trust assets was in direct violation of the trust. 
As such, Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter were knowing par-
ticipants in the breach of trust and are therefore liable to the 
beneficiary, Anna Lee Anderson. Given James Anderson's breach of 
trust and Defendant Pahnke and Dean Witter's knowing participa-
tion therein, Anna Lee Anderson is the only logical choice to 
file a claim in this matter. At the time this action was filed 
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James N. Anderson was till the Trustee of the Norman Anderson 
Trust. It is clear that the trustee, James Anderson had 
certainly neglected to file any actions for the recovery of the 
Norman Anderson Trust assets. 
In this action, Defendants have attempted to create an 
impossible dilemma for Plaintiff by suggesting that the trustee 
is the appropriate party Plaintiff in this action as well as an 
indispensible party Defendant. Common sense clearly tells us 
that James Anderson would not file an action on behalf of the 
trust for return of the trust assets naming himself as a defen-
dant. It is clear under the authorities cited above, that there 
is not only a recognized right in the beneficiary to bring suit 
for a violation of the trust agreement but, even under the 
restricted Restatement view, the beneficiary is the appropriate 
party plaintiff in this action. Consequently Judge Frederick 
erred in granting the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
II. The Trustee Is Not An Indispensible Party To This Action. 
A. Ralph Pahnke And Dean Witter Acted As Defacto 
Trustees Of The Norman Anderson Trust. 
It is a well established principle of equity that a third 
party who participates with a fiduciary in the breach of his duty 
to the beneficiary, with knowledge that the fiduciary's intended 
actions will violate such obligation or otherwise constitute a 
breach of trust, is a participant in the breach of trust himself 
and liable therefor to the beneficiary. Restatement (Second) 
Trusts §326 (1976). See, also, Seminole Nation v. United States, 
316 U.S. 286, 62 S.Ct. 1049, 1054 (1942); Whitney v. Citibank, 
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N.A. , 782 F.2d 1106, 1115-1117 (2d Cir. 1986). More 
specifically, ". . . one who, even without breaching any duty 
owed on his behalf, aids a Trustee in breaching the Trustee's 
fiduciary duty . . . may be held liable as a defacto trustee even 
if he does not benefit from the breach". Wisconsin Real Estate 
Investment Trust v, Weinstein, 509 F.Supp. 1289, 1300 (E.D. Wis. 
1981). See, also, U.S. v. Rivieccio, 661 F.Supp. 281, 294 (E.D. 
N.Y. 1987). 
Addressing the third-party obligation of fair dealing when 
transacting business with those holding a fiduciary duty to 
another, the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Ayer. 101 
U.S. 320, 25 L.Ed. 955 (1879), stated: 
The law exacts the most perfect good faith from 
all parties dealing with a trustee respecting 
trust property. Whoever takes it for an object 
other than the general purposes of the trust, or 
such as may reasonably be supposed to be within 
its scope, must look to the authority of the 
trustee, or he will act at his peril. 
101 U.S. at 327. The Smith Court specifically held that a third 
party dealing with a trustee and the trust assets, undertakes a 
responsibility to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining 
limitations which may be imposed upon the trustee regarding the 
permissibility of disposition of trust property; and, H. . . 
however free from intentional wrong, they must bear the respon-
sibility of mistake in judgment with respect to those limita-
tions". IcL. at 325. 
At common law, non-fiduciary third parties are jointly and 
severally liable for inducing a trustee to make dispositions of 
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trust property in violation of the trust agreement or law, and 
for unlawfully borrowing trust funds. Donovan v. Schmoutey, 592 
F.Supp. 1361, 1396 (D. Nev. 1984). The requisite elements neces-
sary to establish a knowing participation in breach of fiduciary 
duty includes acts or omissions which further or complete the 
breach and which are executed with actual or constructive 
knowledge at the time the transaction became a breach. Id. at 
The common law of trusts imposes particular duties 
and obligations on parties which deal with trusts, 
including the following. 
(a) The law requires of those dealing with a trustee 
the exercise of good faith toward the beneficiaries of 
the trust . . . 
(b) Persons knowingly dealing with trustees are under a 
duty of inquiry . . . 
Id. (Citations omitted). 
Utah law limits the "duty of inquiry" imposed upon 
third persons but continues to impose a duty upon those who have 
"actual knowledge" of limitations of the trustee's trust powers. 
Utah Code Ann. S75-7-406 provides: 
With respect to a third person dealing with a 
trustee or assisting a trustee in the conduct of a 
transaction, the existence of trust power and 
their proper exercise by the trustee may be 
assumed without inquiry. The third person is not 
bound to inquire whether the trustee has power to 
act or is properly exercising the power; and a 
third person, without actual knowledge that the 
trustee is exceeding his power or improperly 
exercising them, is fully protected in the 
dealings with a trustee as if the trustee pos-
sessed and properly exercised the powers he 
purports to exercise. A third person is not bound 
to assure the proper application of trust assets 
paid or delivered to the trustee. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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Defendants have freely admitted that they were in possession of 
the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement and that they had read it and 
interpreted it. Having read and interpreted the trust agreement, 
Defendants possessed actual knowledge that the transfer of assets 
contained in the Norman Anderson Trust was wrongful and in direct 
violation of the terms of the trust agreement. 
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear whether a broker 
may claim protection under Utah Code Ann. §75-7-406 for failure 
to ascertain the powers and limitations of a trustee when 
engaging in business with a trustee. As stated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Utah State University, et al. v. Sutro & 
Company, 646 P.2d 715, (Utah 1982): 
It is not to be questioned that [brokers], who are 
licensed to render service as brokers, must be 
deemed to have and use specialized knowledge, 
experience and integrity in rendering that 
service; and more specifically, here, that they 
have an especially high degree of care to ascer-
tain the authority of a trustee dealing with 
public funds. 
646 P.2d at 717. While the foregoing case relates to a broker's 
duty of care when dealing with trustees of public funds, the 
Court acknowledged that brokers, due to their specialized 
knowledge and experience are under a more particularized duty to 
ascertain the powers and limits of trustees with whom they deal. 
Inasmuch as Utah Code Ann. §75-7-406 was enacted in 1975, it must 
be presumed that the Sutro Court was aware of its existence when 
it placed a duty upon brokers to ascertain the authority of a 
trustee. Defendant Pahnke was the trust's broker with special-
ized knowledge and experience and was under a duty to determine 
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the limitations of authority placed upon James Anderson as 
trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust. 
Having been established as participants in the breach of 
trust, Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter are liable for any and 
all damages resulting from the breach of trust, even though they 
were not the recipients of the particular assets involved in the 
wrongful transaction. See, Donovan, 592 F.Supp. at 1396. Third 
party participants in breaches of a fiduciary duty owed by 
another are directly liable for both compensatory damages and 
punitive damages. Whitney v. Citibank, N.A., 782 F.2d 1106 (2d 
Cir. 1986). 
Because Defendant Pahnke and Dean Witter are actually 
defacto trustees, as set forth above, the action filed by Anna 
Lee Anderson was actually against co-trustees to the Norman 
Anderson Trust. Consequently, dismissal of Plaintiff's original 
complaint was improper. 
B. Plaintiff Is Not Obligated To Join James Anderson 
As An Indispensible Party Defendant. 
The authorities are substantial that permit a plaintiff to 
sue a third party for violation of a trust agreement without 
joining the actual trustee. See, Matter Of Hadleiqh D. Hyde 
Trust, 458 N.W.2d 802 (S.D. 1990) (Co-trustee permitted defendant 
co-trustee to handle operation of trusts, including investments, 
and co-trustee was unaware of mismanagement by defendant. Defend-
ant was not entitled to surcharge co-trustee for any amounts that 
defendant was required to pay the trust); Alioto v. United 
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States, 593 F.Supp. 1402 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Beneficiary may bring 
action against trustee and constructive trustee, either 
separately or jointly as co-defendants, and there is no require-
ment that beneficiary's action against constructive trustee be 
premised on beneficiary's inability to recover from trustee); 
Reiner v, Kelly, 457 N.E.2d 946 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (Generally, 
trustee is not liable for wrongful acts of co-trustee). More-
over, the authorities are additionally numerous in situations 
where there is joint and several liability of tortfeasors, as in 
the present case, and the law does not impose a duty upon the 
plaintiff to sue joint tortfeasors. See, Smith v. State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Company, 633 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1980) (Where 
insured, as owner of life estate and property, brought suit to 
recover for fire loss after insured's refusal to pay on policy, 
and was involved in voluntary bankruptcy proceedings at the time 
of the loss; the failure to join insured's trustee in bankruptcy 
was appropriate); Burnette v. Grant Mutual Casualty Company, 311 
F.Supp. 873 (E.D. Tenn. 1970) (Where persons are jointly and 
severally liable, one may bring an action against insuror without 
joining the other). 
In Struble v. N.J. Brewery Emp. Welfare Trust Fund, 732 
F.2d 325 (3rd Cir. 1984), suit was brought by former employees 
against former employers, Employees Welfare Trust Fund and 
trustees of the Fund alleging various violations of the trust as 
well as a breach of the trustee's fiduciary duties. The Third 
Circuit held that multiple trustees who are at fault may be held 
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jointly and severally liable but that the union trustees were not 
indispensible parties. In so holding, the Court stated: 
We also reject the argument that the Union 
Trustees are indispensible parties to this action. 
Cases cited by the defendants consider whether the 
trustees are indispensible to an action alleging 
violations of the trust agreement. These cases do 
not require, however, that the plaintiff name all 
of the Trustees as defendants. It is a well-
established principle of trust law that multiple 
trustees who are at fault may be held jointly and 
severally liable. If the Union Trustees are at 
fault, the defendants may join them. 
732 F.2d at 332. (Citations omitted). (Emphasis in original). 
As in Struble, should defendants believe that James Anderson 
is liable for breach of trust as trustee of the Norman Anderson 
Trust, they are free to join him as a third-party defendant in 
the present action. However, defendants1 contention that James 
Anderson is an indispensible party whose absence requires 
dismissal of this action, is without merit and plaintiff's 
original complaint was improperly dismissed. 
III. Plaintiff's Claims Are Timely Filed 
Immediately upon learning of the improper transfer of assets 
from the Norman Anderson Trust, the original Plaintiff, Anna Lee 
Anderson, filed the present proceeding in December, 1990. (Rec. 
154, para. 12). Judge Frederick found, however, that Plaintiff's 
claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges causes of action for breach 
of contract, tortious interference with contract, breach of 
fiduciary duty and negligence. Defendants claimed that even 
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under the longest possible statute of limitations, six years 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2) (1953) as amended, 
Plaintiff's Complaint would still be time barred. Both Judge 
Frederick and defendants failed to recognize, however, that 
plaintiff did not discover his potential causes of action until 
December, 1990, when the beneficiary, Anna Lee Anderson, learned 
of the wrongful transfers of trust assets by the trustee, James 
N. Anderson. 
It is well established that "a cause of action does not 
accrue and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until 
the plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have learned of the facts which give rise to the 
cause of action." Klincrer v. Kightly, 792 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah 
1990). Indeed, in the present case, Anna Lee Anderson, the 
beneficiary of the Norman Anderson Trust, was unaware of the 
essential facts giving rise to her cause of action until 
December, 1990. Furthermore, it is clear that the prior trustee 
of the Norman Anderson Trust, James Anderson, was also unaware of 
the breach of the terms of the Norman Anderson Trust. (Rec. 147-
48, para. 6). Even if James Anderson had been aware of the 
breach of the Trust, it is clear that the beneficiary and her 
successor trustee would not be barred because of Defendant 
Pahnke's and Defendant Dean Witter's knowing participation in the 
breach of the Trust. This policy is set out in the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, § 327. 
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(2) If the third person knowingly 
participated in a breach of trust, the 
beneficiary is not precluded from maintaining 
an action against him therefore, unless: 
(a) the beneficiary is himself guilty of 
laches, or; 
(b) a co-trustee who did not participate in 
the breach of trust, or a successor trustee 
knowing of the claim against the third person, 
fails to bring an action against him until he 
is barred by the Statute of Limitations or by 
laches. 
Restatement (Second) of Trust, § 327 at 126. Thus, "where the 
trustee transfers trust property in breach of Trust to a third 
person who has actual knowledge of the breach of Trust, it is 
clear that the beneficiaries will not be barred by the lapse of 
time merely because the trustee is barred." IV A. Scott, The Law 
of Trusts, § 327.2 at 326 (4th Ed. 1989) and cases cited therein. 
The comment on Subsection (2) of the Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts, §327 similarly provides that 
If a third person knowingly participates in the 
breach of trust, the beneficiary is not barred from 
maintaining a suit against him merely because the 
trustee is barred. The beneficiary will be barred 
if, but only if, he is himself guilty of laches. 
Thus, the beneficiary will not be barred if he is 
under an incapacity or ordinarily if he did not 
know of the breach of trust. 
Id. at 127-28. 
Numerous cases have similarly held that the statute of 
limitations shall not be a bar in actions against third parties 
who had participated with the trustee in a breach of trust. In 
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Skinner v. DeKalb Federal Savings & Loan, 246 Ga. 561, 272 S.E.2d 
260 (1980), the plaintiffs had filed suit against the defendant 
savings and loan association who had allegedly participated in 
the breach of trust by the plaintiffs1 mother. The trial court 
had granted defendant summary judgment on the grounds that the 
plaintiffs1 claims were barred the statute of limitations. In 
reversing the lower court, the Georgia Supreme Court agreed that 
11
 [t]he general rule is that when the trustee is barred by the 
statute of limitation from pursuing a claim, the beneficiaries of 
a trust are barred also." 272 S.E.2d at 262. The Court 
concluded, however, that "[t]he rule is otherwise where the third 
party against whom the trust has a claim knowingly participated 
with the trustee in the breach of the trust." Id. See, also. 
Hammons v. National Surety Co., 287 P. 292 (Ariz. 1930); State 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Commercial Trust & Sav. Bank, 300 Ill.App. 
435, 21 N.E.2d 157 (1939); American Nat. Bank of Enid v. Crews, 
126 P.2d 733 (Okla. 1942); Baldwin v. Taplin, 34 A.2d 117 (Vt. 
1943); Connelly v. Florida Nat. Bank of Jacksonville, 120 So.2d 
647 (Fla. 1960); Jones v. State, 432 P.2d 420 (Idaho 1967). 
In the present case, the uncontroverted affidavits of Anna 
Lee Anderson and James Anderson clearly indicate that Defendants 
Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds had actual notice of the contents 
of the Norman Anderson Trust. It is further clear that Defendant 
Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds were very well aware that the 
May, 1980 transfer of assets from the Norman Anderson Trust was 
in direct contravention of the specific terms of said trust. 
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Despite their knowledge of the express terms of the trust, 
Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter nevertheless participated in 
the breach of trust and profited therefrom. Plaintiff filed the 
original Complaint immediately upon learning of the wrongful 
transfer of assets from the Norman Anderson Trust. Given 
defendants1 clear knowledge of the terms of the trust, and their 
knowing participation in the wrongful transfer of trust assets, 
defendants cannot now claim the benefit of the statute of 
limitations. Consequently, the district court erred in granting 




From the foregoing, it is clear that Anna Lee Anderson, as 
beneficiary of the Norman Anderson Trust, was the proper party to 
bring the present action against the defendants. James Anderson, 
the trustee of the trust, had breached the trust in transferring 
trust assets to his own account. Furthermore, James Anderson had 
not, and was not going to file suit on behalf of the trust. 
Consequently, it was improper for the district court to dismiss 
plaintiff's Complaint and this Court should therefore reverse the 
district court and remand this case for further proceedings. 
It is further clear that James Anderson is not an 
indispensible party to this action. Defendants Pahnke and Dean 
Witter participated in James Anderson's breach of trust. Their 
participation gave them the status of defacto trustees and proper 
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party defendants. If Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter wanted to 
assert claims against James Anderson, they could have brought him 
in as a third party defendant. It was therefore improper for the 
district court to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint on the grounds of 
failure to join an indispensible party and this Court should 
therefore reverse the district court and remand this case for 
further proceedings. 
Finally, it is well established that a knowing participant 
in a breach of trust cannot raise the statute of limitations as a 
bar against the beneficiary of the trust who is not guilty of 
laches. In this case it is clear that Anna Lee Anderson acted 
swiftly in filing this action once she learned that there had 
been a wrongful transfer of assets from the Norman Anderson 
trust. Consequently, the district court erred in granting 
defendants summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff's 
claims were barred by the statute of limitations and this Court 
should therefore reverse the district court and remand this case 
for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z7fa day of January, 1992. 
THOMPSON ^  HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
RTON 
neys for Plaintiff/ 
ant 
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I hereby certify that I hand-delivered four copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellants to Joseph J. Palmer and Reid E. 
Lewis, Moyle & Draper, 600 Deseret Plaza, 15 E. 100^., S^lt Lake 





Joseph J. Palmer (no. 2505), and 
Reid E. Lewis (no. 1951), of 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915 
Telephone: (801) 521-0250 
Attorneys for Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
and Ralph Pahnke 
Third Judicial District 
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LAKECObNTY 
Py. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA LEE ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., 
a foreign corporation, 
RALPH PAHNKE and 
JOHN DOES I THROUGH XXV, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 900907186CN 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and Ralph Pahnke filed a 
Motion to Dismiss, dated April 15, 1991. The motion was decided 
by the Court upon receipt of a Notice to Submit, filed July 10, 
1991. Based upon the record, and for good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
2. This action is hereby dismissed pursuant to Rules 
12(b)(6)-(7) and 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for 
failure of plaintiff to state a claim against Dean Witter 
mw rtlorderdwr 719 91 
CKl(iv^l4 
Reynolds, Inc. and Ralph Pahnke upon which relief can be granted, 
and for failure of plaintiff to join the trustee of the Norman 
Anderson Trust as an indispensable party to this proceeding. 
DATED: . 1991. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19 day of July, 1991, a 
copy of the Order was hand-delivered to: 
James E. Morton 
Paul Hatch 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
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SEP 2 7 1991 
Joseph J. Palmer (no. 2505), and 
Reid E. Lewis (no. 1951), of 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915 
Telephone: (801) 521-0250 
Attorneys for Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
and Ralph Pahnke 
f# fHE tHIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUMT TOR SMX LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA LEE ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, : ORDER 
v. : 
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., : 
a foreign corporation, : Civil No. 900907186CN 
RALPH PAHNKE and : 
JOHN DOES I THROUGH XXV, : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants. : 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and Ralph Pahnke filed a 
Motion to Dismiss, dated August 6, 1991. The motion was heard by 
the Court, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding, on 
September 16, 1991. Plaintiff was represented by James E. Morton 
of Thompson, Morton, Hatch & Skeen. Defendants were represented 
by Reid E. Lewis and E. Jay Sheen of Moyle & Draper, P.C. Based 
upon the record, upon argument, and for good cause shown, 
IrV. 
mb relorder dw2 
u •:>();% m 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Motion to Dismiss is granted• 
2. This action is hereby dismissed. 
DATED: September jnlfr^991. 
BY THE* COURT: 
Dennis Frederick 
Judge 
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1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
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